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An essential task of groups is to provide efficient solutions for the complex problems they face.
Indeed, considerable efforts have been devoted to the question of collective decision-making
related to problems involving a single dominant feature. Here we introduce a quantitative
formalism for finding the optimal distribution of the group members’ competences in the
more typical case when the underlying problem is complex, i.e., multidimensional. Thus, we
consider teams that are aiming at obtaining the best possible answer to a problem having a
number of independent sub-problems. Our approach is based on a generic scheme for the
process of evaluating the proposed solutions (i.e., negotiation). We demonstrate that the best
performing groups have at least one specialist for each sub-problem – but a far less intuitive
result is that finding the optimal solution by the interacting group members requires that
the specialists also have some insight into the sub-problems beyond their unique field(s). We
present empirical results obtained by using a large-scale database of citations being in good
agreement with the above theory. The framework we have developed can easily be adapted
to a variety of realistic situations since taking into account the weights of the sub-problems,
the opinions or the relations of the group is straightforward. Consequently, our method can
be used in several contexts, especially when the optimal composition of a group of decision-
makers is designed.
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Introduction
Addressing the process of collective decision making has represented a great scientific challenge
for a long time 1–4. It is a highly relevant aspect of the behavior of social groups, in particular,
because as it has been argued, measured and shown analytically: the “wisdom of crowds” can go
qualitatively beyond that of the individuals’ 2. This statement also holds for animal assemblies
5–7. A rarely considered, but essential case is when the problem to be solved is complex, i.e., has
many facets. Under such conditions the quality of the collective solution is highly influenced by
the composition of the group. Obviously, if the members of the group are identical, the group’s
performance can hardly go beyond that of any of its member’s. However, if the problem to be
solved is complex – i.e., has a number of different aspects or “dimensions” 8 – a group having
members specialized in their respective kinds of sub-problems is expected to be much more ef-
ficient in providing a high quality answer, than a uniform one. The stress is on the independent
nature of the sub-problems, making the problem high-dimensional. In a way our present work can
be considered as a quantitative approach to the problem of division of labor 9, 10 in the context of
collective decision making (the task/labor is to bring about a decision; the division is made among
the specialists of the sub-problems).
In spite of the above almost trivial observation regarding heterogeneous, diverse or “mul-
tidimensional” groups, a quantitative demonstration of its validity needs a carefully constructed
framework. Prior works involving quantitative analysis have almost exclusively focused on prob-
lems that could be regarded as “one-dimensional” 2, 11–13 from our point of view which considers
a problem having several dimensions (being multidimensional) if it can be broken down into sub-
problems, each having its own characteristic feature independent of those of the others’. In the case
of one-dimensional problems it has been demonstrated – using approaches from theory (see, eg.,
the pioneering works 11, 13) through genetic optimization 13 to agent based modeling/simulations 14
and observations 15, 16 – that diverse groups can outperform homogeneous ones.
Intuition suggests that a group of specialists (one competent person for each sub-problem)
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should be optimal regarding the quality of the solution with the constraint of minimizing costs
at the same time. Here we present a generic agent-based approach which – due to its minimal
assumptions – quantitatively demonstrates that the breadth of knowledge of its members makes
a group more efficient, i.e., being capable of using a smaller amount of resources to produce a
more beneficial solution in a wide variety of potential applications. This is what corresponds to
the “synergy” resulting in a better decision relative to the one following from a simple “linear”
aggregation of the proposed solutions. And what we show in our work is how this synergy can
emerge from a negotiation process. Naturally, negotiation is absent (generally) in animal societies.
Specialization is the result of age or hormone level etc.
A paradigmatic example for our approach is that of a board of directors for a large company
(however, there are many other possible examples ranging from a group of animals searching for
resources up to a government or simply a team carrying out interdisciplinary research). In the case
of a board of directors a potential candidate problem is that of finding the best possible placement
and product for a new factory. Obviously, the various aspects of this problem are quite diverse,
each of them requiring specific knowledge, i.e., the decision involves knowledge of the history of
the given country, various features of the labor force (education, etc.), geographical and logistic
conditions, potential market in the region, and so on. It is an important feature of the situation that
the members of the group cannot get any information about the quality of their propositions from
an “outsider” who could know the optimal solution ab ovo.
Results
Modeling collective decision-making We have aimed at a model that is simple, but is still ap-
propriate for projecting a wide class of realistic situations onto it. In our approach, the process of
collective decision-making is divided into four basic stages (described in the third subsection).
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i) Basic assumptions
We consider groups of N individuals solving a problem P having M sub-problems Pj (j =
1, 2, ,M ) such that for addressing each sub-problem a unique (specific) skill is needed. Thus,
we are dealing with a set of N ×M abilities or levels/degrees of skill, Aij (i = 1, 2, , N ), these
values being proportional to the ability/competence (e.g., accuracy) of an individual i to give the
best answer for the jth sub-problem. We do not initially specify the Aij parameters: the method
we apply will result in their optimal values.
ii) Defining optimal groups
Without losing the generality of the above setting, we assume that Aij-s take their values from
the unit interval [0, 1]. The ability matrix is also related to the costs involved in finding a solution
(since acquiring a high ability to successfully address a sub-problem involves costs, such as expe-
rience, learning, etc.). It is obvious that the cost of obtaining an ability A is typically not a linear
function of A, since achieving the capacity of perfect knowledge (A = 1) is much more costly than
achieving a partial knowledge (e.g., A = 0.5). For the sake of simplicity we assume that the cost
C for obtaining ability A, is
C = f(A) = const · Ax (1)
(where 1 < x, and const is a constant corresponding to the relative weights of the costs, when
calculating the fitness of a group for given Aij-s). We start with a random distribution of the Aij
values and search for their optimal distribution (by letting them evolve). Here optimal distribution
means one which provides the best possible solution for the smallest possible – or for a given
prefixed – cost.
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iii) Opinions, information diffusion and decision-making
During the “information diffusion” phase the members of the group interact through evaluating the
solutions of the sub-problems “proposed” by the other members such that the quality of a given
proposition (by member i for the jth problem) is (in the simplest case) assumed to be
Qij = Aij. (2)
First, each member evaluates all the propositions. The evaluation made by member i′ regard-
ing the quality Qij is denoted by Ei
′
ij and it is proportional to both Qij and Ai′j . The accuracy of
such an evaluation is distorted by a stochastic factor representing that those members who have
small abilities to evaluate a proposal tend to make mistakes in their appreciation with an amplitude
involving randomness. These evaluations (Ei′ij) represent the central ingredient of our approach.
These are next (in several rounds of an imaginary “round table discussion”) modified by fur-
ther interactions (communication/evaluation) with other group members, i′′, chosen with a proba-
bility proportional to their abilities concerning problem Pj , Ai′′j . The total number of additional
evaluations in a given decision-making event is equal to X% of N . The quality of the solution
for a given Pj is obtained by accepting the proposal of member i∗ receiving the highest average
evaluation
Emaxj = Ei∗j, (3)
where
i∗ = argmaxiEij = argmaxi〈Ei
′
ij〉i′ . (4)
Here 〈·〉i′ denotes the average over i′. By the other members concerning his/her proposition for the
solution of problem Pj i.e.,
Qmaxj = Qi∗j = Ai∗j. (5)
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The quality Q of the solution given for P – provided by the whole group – is then obtained
by aggregating the proposals having the highest evaluations for the Pj-s after the last round. A sim-
plified flow diagram of how the model works is given in Fig. 1. It is meant to be self-explanatory,
more details are provided in the Appendix.
Start (Aij)
Where the indices are: i (from 1 to N) over the group
members, j (from 1 to M) over the sub-problems.
Each group member suggests a solution (proposal) for each sub-problem.
The quality Qij of the proposal submitted by individual i for sub-problem j,
depends on the ability/competence of individual in the simplest possible way:
Qij = Aij (we use different notation
because other assumptions can also be made within our approach)
Each group member evaluates all the Qij-s.
The evaluated (by member i′) quality of the proposal submitted by member i regarding
sub-problem j, Ei
′
ij depends on the ability value of member i
′:
Ei
′
ij = Qij ·Ai′j + (1 −Ai′j) ·Rand,
where Rand is a random number from the (0, 1) interval.
Round table discussion: X% of the N members (i′′-s, having relatively high abilities)
present their evaluation of the prior evaluations so
that the next values of the Ei
′
ij-s become:
Ei
′
ij(t + 1) = E
i′
ij(t) +
1
N (E
i′′
ij (t) − Ei
′
ij(t))
The quality of the solution for a given Pj is obtained by accepting the proposal
of member i∗ receiving the highest average evaluation Emaxj = Ei∗j by the other members
concerning his/her proposition for the solution of problem Pj i.e.,
Qmaxj = Ai∗j .
End (output)
Q, the overall quality of the solution (aggregated Qmaxj -s)
C, the cost involved (sum of f(Aij)-s)
F , the fitness of the group: F = Q− C
Figure 1 Flow diagram representation of a single step (generation) during the genetic
optimization. For notations see the text. This chart gives a detailed description of the process
through which the corresponding fitness (efficiency) value F is calculated based on the given
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ability matrix (Aij). In the next step of the genetic algorithm these F -s are used as weights based
on which the “parents” of the new generation are chosen (after the combination of two parents,
random perturbations, “mutations” are applied before finalizing the groups of the “young”
generation).
Results from simulations
General properties In Fig. 2 we show results for Amaxij using equation 6, i.e., evaluating both
the quality and the cost of the obtained Aij and considering the average of the entire population at
the end of the evolutionary process. In most of the figures – in addition to visualizing the values
of Amaxij – we also plot how the fitness F , the quality of the solution Q and the cost C changes as
a function of the generation number G (as the population of groups evolves). In addition, we also
display how the diversity D of the abilities depends on G. In all cases we find that the optimal
distribution of the abilities is highly diverse. In all plots we use N = 10 and M = 14 without
loss of generality (the main features of the optimal ability distribution do not differ qualitatively
for different N and M pairs).
Figure 2 demonstrates some relevant features of both the process (the progress of the genetic
algorithm) and the outcome of optimizing the ability distribution. Random initial conditions corre-
spond to relatively low fitness and high costs. The efficiency/fitness of a group quickly increases at
the first stage of the optimization. An important observation is that higher fitness is accompanied
by larger diversity values (D).
Our results come from simple and realistic assumptions regarding the “negotiation/discussion”
process. Although the corresponding rules and calculations are not trivially transparent at all, nev-
ertheless a relatively plausible interpretation for the main result can be provided. Perhaps the most
essential step in our algorithm is the one when the group members, one after another, provide an
evaluation of the proposals of the other members. If a member has zero ability to evaluate the
proposal for a given sub-problem, then the contribution of this member to choosing the otherwise
very good proposition becomes totally erratic (see Fig. 1, defining equation of Ei′ij). Conversely,
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even a relatively small ability to estimate the right value of a proposal results in a decreased level
of randomness in the evaluation and, in this way, provides a more accurate estimated proposition
quality. When the evaluations are aggregated to choose the best answer, the latter, more consistent
contributions become to play an essential role.
Figure 2 Illustration of both the process (A,B) and the end result (C) of calculating the optimal
distribution of abilities/competences, Amaxij , using a genetic optimization method. In (A) the
generation number (G) dependence of the average fitness values (F ) of the groups is plotted
(red) for the fixed amount of cost, C = 0.3 (dark blue). The averaging is made over a population
size of 2000 groups. The corresponding diversity, D, is indicated by the black line. The groups
had N = 10 members and M = 14 sub-problems had to be answered. In (B) we display the
evolution of the relevant parameters when the optimization is done with non-fixed ability cost C.
(C) Displays the optimal ability matrix visualized with colors – the scale being indicated in (D).
These results are for a generic case into which a few plausible assumptions are incorporated: the
sub-problems have equal importance (weight) and X = 30% of the members take role in the
round-table discussion. The most relevant message of (C) is that there is one specialist for each
sub-problem (not necessarily one person per sub-problem) and, perhaps rather intriguingly, the
specialists are found to have a clearly non-negligible competence concerning several of the other
sub-problems. If we add some cost for the case when a single person is a specialist of more than
one sub-problem, the solution ceases to have multiple specialities per person.
Robustness Next we investigate the robustness of the new results stemming from our approach
by testing the method on a few specific conditions. First, we start the optimization from different
initial conditions and check whether the results are consistent with each other (have the same
overall features). Figure 3 shows two different directions of the comparison. In Fig. 3A we show
how similarly the main quantities (A, D, F and Q) evolve during four (stochastically) independent
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optimization processes starting from different random initial conditions and lead to rather different
final configurations (presented in Fig. 3B). However, the essential features of the solutions are the
same and the generation number (G) dependence of the above four quantities is also very similar.
Figure 3D shows a number of frames from an imaginary movie visualizing how the ability matrix
converges for growing G to its final state for a given set of initial abilities. Related movie files are
included in the Appendix.
Figure 3 Visualization of the optimization for four different (random) initial conditions and
(stochastic) realizations. Although the individual ability distributions are different, they correspond
to about the same level of optimality which can be seen from the four curves virtually overlapping
in all cases. The wiggles around G = 2000 and G = 2500 are due to the momentarily increased
level of perturbations or “mutations” within the genetic algorithm (in the spirit of simulated
annealing, see Materials and methods). (D) displays the development of the ability matrix as the
genetic algorithm progresses. Here and in one of the displays in (B) a combination of column
heights and colors is used to visualize the values of the ability matrix.
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Continuous vs. two-valued In Fig. 4 we display results obtained from an optimization of the
ability matrix where the Aij values are, in the first case, arbitrary (continuous between 0 and
1), while in the alternative case, either 1 (full competence) or 0 (zero competence). In the two-
valued case we expect that the trivial optimal solution is a group having 1 specialist for each
sub-problem (the same member can be a specialist for more than 1 sub-problem, but we expect a
single specialist per sub-problem). Such a solution would indeed be optimal if full knowledge was
not too expensive and no discussion/evaluation took place. In reality this is not the case though
since both the independent evaluation of an expert and the cost of hiring him/her are very high.
This aspect of the problem can be accounted for by our cost function f(A).
Figure 4 (A) Best and (B) average performance (fitness) values as a function of G obtained for
the two fundamental variants for the possible Aij : one allowing any values between 0 and one,
while the second having only two possible (0 or 1) values. This is an important test to
demonstrate that the intuitive, trivial choice for the abilities of the members, i.e., 1 corresponding
to perfect competence while 0 corresponding to zero competence (with regard to a given
sub-problem) results in less efficient groups. The reason is increased cost for Aij = 1 and the
inefficient discussion phase (due to the presence of the totally incompetent members). The
average fitness of the 2000 groups in a generation is significantly lower than that of the best
performing ones in the binary case. The continuous distribution is much less sensitive to random
perturbations than the two-valued one, the best and average performances are also very similar.
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Indeed, we find for realistic situations (full special knowledge is expensive and discussion
can improve finding the optimal solution) that our approach results in a multiple-valued ability
distribution performing better than the one constructed only from the trivial 1 and 0 abilities. In
short, our formalism can be used to find the appropriate strategy (choosing between hiring top
specialists or implementing longer discussions). Through adding some cost for the length of the
discussion phase, even the optimal discussion time can be determined.
Results based on big data analysis
The above results are also exemplified by a number of studies on collaboration, especially on the
creative groups formed by scientists working on solving increasingly complex problems. At a very
recent meeting 21 on interdisciplinary science it was concluded that productive interdisciplinary
researchers have a deep knowledge of at least one field but also a working awareness of others.
Or, in other words, during broad collaborations individuals’ breadth is as important as depth of
knowledge in collective decision-making. In fact, Uzzi and collaborators have shown using huge
bibliographic data sets (see 21, 22) that papers of high impact tend to be produced by larger collabo-
rations involving a broader wealth of knowledge.
It is highly non-trivial to test our theory against observations since the quantities we use
are very rarely available. Still, an analysis based on a huge database (Web of Science - WoS
23) provides “experimental” evidence supporting our main theoretical result. Our method to find
evidence supporting the prediction(s) of our approach was based on a very motivating remark by
P. Ball 24.
First, we selected articles published in the years 1997-1999 separately (therefore we have
three sets of papers) and calculated the entropy for each article. Author’s entropy was restricted to
the papers published by them in the years considered (1997-1999), and only authors with at most
50 papers were considered to account for valuable contributions. Then we plot the citations of the
papers as the function of the average entropy of their authors, limiting the results to papers having at
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least 3 and at most 50 authors. We expect highly interdisciplinary publications to show the effect
of receiving high attention (and citations) only after some delay (around 10 years) to a higher
extent than the less interdisciplinary ones. Therefore, for each of the four years, we considered
citations from a single year with a delay of 9, 10 and 11 years. Thus, we obtained nine data sets in
total, describing papers being published from 3 different years and their citations calculated with
3 different time delays. We then binned papers by their entropy in bins with 0.1 width. Results are
shown in Figure 5 (we ignored bins that had less than 10 papers). As the lower and upper quartiles
illustrate, for papers having high average author entropy, the citation distribution prefers higher
values as well, which is also supported by the inset, where all 9 curves are shown. There is a clear
trend towards more successful papers as the average author entropy increases.
Figure 5 Relative success of papers written by collaborating interdisciplinary scientists. Median
citation number of the publications as a function of the average interdisciplinarity of the
corresponding authors (measured by the average entropy of each author’s publications –
averaged over the authors), error bars denote lower and upper quartiles. Data shows the median
of nine trends (papers published between 1997 and 1999; for each year, annual citation count is
calculated 9, 10 and 11 years post-publication). Single trends include only bins with at least 10
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papers. Inset shows the different trends obtained by the three publication years and three citation
years. Only papers with number of authors between 3 and 50 and authors with less than 50
publications have been considered.
Discussion
Our formalism allows its application to more specific cases corresponding to various actual situa-
tions. It is, in some sense, the equivalent of the “division of labor” concept translated to the field
of decision-making. It can be easily generalized to cases with various relative weights/influences
assigned to the group members (depending, e.g., on their social status in an organization) when
their assessment is considered. Additional future research could address further interesting ques-
tions such as, e.g., the optimal size of a group for a given number of sub-problems, the most
reasonable time interval spent on discussions, the effect of “overlapping” problems, etc. Further-
more, the bilateral relations among the members of the group (which may be interpreted as an
underlying network) can play an important role in finding the best solution. However, the main
goal of our present study, instead of demonstrating particular applications, has been to provide
a general framework for further quantitative estimations of essential parameters during collective
decision making concerning complex problems to be solved by multidimensional groups (as far as
concerning the abilities of their members).
Methods
Three important theoretical approaches used during the research are presented in this section.
Numerical procedure of optimization We search for the optimal ability distribution by using
an improved (“simulated annealing” type) version of the standard, so called, genetic algorithm.
During this procedure, in each “time step” or “generation”, two sets of Aij -s are randomly per-
turbed and merged. Aij-s are selected for merging with a probability proportional to their level of
goodness/efficiency or “fitness”, F , where
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F = Q− C (6)
(i.e., fitness or the efficiency, F , of a group is equal to quality of the solution of the complex
problem minus the cost needed to obtain such an answer). Some further details and the whole
optimization process algorithm are described later and in the Appendix.
The subsection Basic assumptions represents our basic setting. Note that the concrete prob-
lem (P ) is not specified. In addition, we have only two arbitrary parameters (the level of stochas-
ticity, Rand, during the second evaluation step, plus the proportion of the evaluators X%). N
and M are simple input parameters depending upon an actual situation. The description of the
process may seem lengthy, however, it directly corresponds to our everyday practice during group
decisions.
It is important to note that our approach is not related to the question of kin versus group
selection in any way. We do not assume that the well performing groups we find evolve as a result
of competition/selection between groups. Instead, we use an optimization procedure to find an
efficient group which then is to be composed “from outside”, i.e., by other people being motivated
to have a group which is likely to come up with good decisions for a given class of complex
problems.
We use a genetic algorithm 17 to find optimal solutions because this approach is known to be
effective when extreme values for a function with a relatively large number of variables is being
searched. Here relatively large means numbers above 8 − 10, i.e., we are looking for optima of a
function which is defined in a high-dimensional space. In addition, (just like in the case of fitness
landscapes or the free energy landscape for spin glasses and alike) our fitness function is likely to
have a huge number of local maxima, and a single (or a class of) configuration(s) (sets of Aij-s
with maximal fitness) corresponding to a global maximum. This is why we also integrate into our
approach a technique analogous to the one called “simulated annealing” 18 used for finding the
minima of the free energy in the case of problems from statistical mechanics. In our case this is
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realized by temporarily increasing the mutation rate when the actual solution seems to converge
(stops changing as a function of the generation number). Even when applying this method, one
cannot be sure that in the limit of a large number of generations the absolute optimum can be
reached. Thus, usually a further, quite natural, and implicitly widely used approach is taken by
assuming that the pseudo-global, optimal solutions possess the same statistical features.
Measuring diversity Since our main goal is to show the advantages of a high-dimensional, di-
verse ability distribution, we need a definition of diversity well suited to our approach. Our findings
(visualized in Figs. 2 and 3) indicate that the optimal Aij values are distributed in a way which
is rather different from a Gaussian type (well defined mean and values scattered around it). Thus,
for our purpose, standard deviation as a measure of diversity would not serve as a good candidate.
Other widely used diversity measures (perhaps the best known of which is the Shannon informa-
tion) also did not turn out to be well suited for our case. On the other hand, calculating the extent
of diversity using the expression 19
D =
∑
i,j
[(
max
i
Aij
)− Aij]
M · (N − 1) (7)
gives results which differentiate among the diversity of distributions in a way being both in accord
with the intuition and sensitive enough in the range determined by the actual distributions of Aij-s
throughout the simulations.
Entropy and heterogeneity To measure the effect of the heterogeneous ability distribution in
solving a task by a group of individuals, we calculated the level of interdisciplinarity of scientific
publications using the WoS database, where subject classes are assigned to each article, which in
our view correspond to the different types of sub-tasks. We define the level of interdisciplinarity,
IP , of a published paper by the Shannon entropy over the subject class distribution of the publica-
tions in its reference list20. More precisely, we collect all subject classes from the papers appearing
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among the references of the article (Sref(P)) and consider the distribution obtained, thus:
IP = −
∑
s∈Sref(P)
ps ln ps, (8)
where ps denotes the probability of subject class s in the set of subject classes based on the papers
in the reference Sref(P).
Analogously, an author’s interdisciplinarity is related to the average entropy of the publica-
tions this author has:
Ia = 〈IP〉P∈P(a), (9)
i.e., the higher entropy corresponds to a higher level of interdisciplinarity of an author. Here
P(a) denotes the papers of author a. We use the publication entropy instead of the subject class
of the author’s papers, since there can be authors who publish in a small number of different
journals but can be still interdisciplinary. In other words, in calculating the heterogeneity of the
authors’ abilities, the entropy of their publications has a higher resolution and thus it provides a
more accurate description of their interdisciplinarity. Finally, each paper is considered as a task,
and the level of heterogeneity in the distribution of the authors’ ability is defined by the average
interdisciplinarity of the authors. Here we measure the success of solving the task by the number
of citations the paper receives.
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Appendix
General presentation of the model On a technical level our approach can be described as opti-
mum searching on a high-dimensional highly rugged surface. Thus it has two main components:
the searching mechanism and the function defining the surface.
For the optimum-seeking process we use a genetic algorithm enhanced with some simulated
annealing-like features, which induces perturbations in the mutation rate to ensure the stability
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of the obtained result. An interesting feature of this approach is that it obtains results which are
reachable and maintainable.
The function defining the surface includes the modeling of the given real-life problem-class
and the estimation of the goodness of the actual evaluated parameters based on the constructed
group-dynamical mechanism. This is called the fitness function.
Genetic Algorithm An altered version of the generic evolutionary algorithm is used to find the
optimum of the fitness function. The “individuals” of this evolutionary process are the groups
modeled through the ability matrices (a 2d array consisting of a 1d array for each member of the
group, resulting in an N ×M matrix, where N is the number of members and M the number of
sub-problems). Thus the population on which the evolution acts is a collection of groups (in our
case the typical population size is K = 2000).
The twist in our approach appears when the random point mutations are applied. Usually a
predefined number of abilities from the whole population are selected, and the mutation consists
in randomly increasing or decreasing their values (within a mutation amplitude range). If the
mutation probability is pm, the number of mutations
nm = K ·N ·M · pm. (10)
But in our case the pm value is not entirely fixed, it can change from generation to generation.
It has a predefined normal value pmn, which is its starting value as well. But if the difference
between the averages of the fitness values in two adjacent 100 (or 500) generations is smaller
than 0.1% (or 1%), then the normal mutation rate (pmn) is increased, and then annealed back to
the original one (during 50 or 100 generations). This solution helps the algorithm to avoid being
stuck in small local optima, and also ensures that the results acquired have high stability, and good
resistance to small perturbations. Additionally the actual value used at each generation is defined
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by the following equation:
pm = pmn · (1− F ), (11)
where F is the population average of the fitness value defined in the next section.
After this step is ready, only the normalization is ahead (when it is not applied, the values
of the abilities appear as cost in the fitness function): here the A matrices of each group from the
emerging generation are normalized such that the
〈c · Aeij〉ij = avg, (12)
where avg is the predefined average value of the abilities.
Fitness function A short description about a concrete realization of the fitness function is also
included in the article, but the aim of this section is to present the most general form of it, under-
lining the generic mechanism of our approach, and also showing its relation to the concrete case
analyzed in the simulations.
Flowchart of the fitness function This function is in fact where the model of the problem-solving
and solution-selection process is encoded in the whole process. The input values are the ability
matrix of a given group and the return value is a real number representing the “fitness” of this
instance. As seen in the above chart the function is totally described by giving the exact forms of
the functions Fproposal, Fevaluation, Fdiscussion, Fselection, Faggregate and Fcost (all of them may include
stochasticity as well).
First each member of the group proposes a solution for each sub problem; these values are
proportional to the members’ abilities regarding the given task. In the article we considered the
simplest case, where the quality of the proposed solution (for problem j by member i, being Qij)
is equal to the respective ability:
Fproposal (Aij) = Aij. (13)
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The equality ensures that the small ability values (those close to zero) do not originate from
the possible noise introduced at this level.
The next step follows: each member evaluates all the solutions which were given to each sub
problem, in the article we use the equation described there:
Fevaluation (Qij, Ai′j) = Qij · Ai′j + (1− Ai′j) · Rand, (14)
where Rand is a uniform random number from the interval (0, 1).
In step c, the discussion phase, X% of the group members (i′′) selected with probability
proportional to their ability in the respective field share their evaluations with the others (i′), who
change their own such values regarding the proposals of everybody (i) for each sub problem (j)
based on this information:
Fdiscussion
(
Ei
′
ij(t),
(
Ei
′′
ij (t)− Ei
′
ij(t)
))
= Ei
′
ij(t) +
1
N
(
Ei
′′
ij (t)− Ei
′
ij(t)
)
. (15)
So here the model supposes that everybody can be influenced in the same way by the current
talker, and their opinions are changed so that the difference between their and the talkers opin-
ion is reduced. (Note that the selection of the evaluators – speakers – happens proportionally to
their ability values. This passage creates a situation in which the speakers are usually “experts”
regarding the given sub-problem.)
Then the evaluations of the members are aggregated. In our case it simply means that for
each sub problem the proposition which received the highest average evaluation is accepted as the
solution of the group (here no hierarchy coefficient is included):
Fselection
(
Ei
′∗
ij , Hij
)
= max
i
∑
i′
Ei
′∗
ij , (16)
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where Ei′∗ij denotes the final value of E
i′
ij .
For calculating the final return value of the fitness function in the article the most simple and
intuitive aggregation function is used:
Faggregate
(
Qmaxj
)
= 〈Qmaxj 〉j. (17)
And in the simplest case (if the average ability cost does not have a predefined value con-
trarily this is just a constant change in the function values) C is simply a monotonous function of
the ability values, but it could also include the time of decision making (which we assumed to be
proportional to the number of talkers in the discussion phase) or other relevant parameters. The
typical case of our approach uses
Fcost (Aij, X) = 〈c · Aeij〉ij (18)
(with typical values c = 4, e = 4).
Animation about the evolution of the ability matrix The animations reachable through the links
present the evolution process of the ability matrix in two different bur very similar realizations of
the simulation using the parameter set used in the core article as well (in the first case the ability
values are represented with colors, in the second case, with colors and bars). It can be nicely
seen how the specialist for each sub-problem emerges from the rest of the group, and an optimal
distribution wins.
See S1 movie and S2 movie.
Comparing the results for different ability cost coefficients and exponents In the case, when
equation 18 holds, there are two independent parameters, namely the c and e constants. We present
in this part the effect of modifying these values.
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Firstly, we observed that the ratio of specialists in a group remained 1
N
in every considered
case, meaning that each sub-problem will have one specialist:
M ·N
N
=M. (19)
(This result was stable within 1% of error range, where the small error could appear when
the two groups – specialists and the rest – could not be separated perfectly.)
Secondly, we considered the average distance between the ability of the specialists (regarding
the sub-field in which they are specialists), and the knowledge of the rest of the group. (This
measure is in fact a synonym of the diversity presented in the method section of the main text).
The results of this inquiry are presented in Figure 6.
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Figure 6 Average distance of a specialist’s ability from the rest of the members’. For the
explanation of the parameters see the text.
This surface plot makes it clear, that as the cost of outstanding knowledge increases (as
the e and c values get higher, the difference between the cost of 0.5 and 1.0 ability values gets
emphasized), the optimal difference between the specialist and the other members gets smaller.
Clearly this is just an example from the huge range of possible uses of the model, and un-
foreseeable range of its applications.
Another outcome of this approach (of changing the two parameters of the ability cost) shows
the stability of the outcome, as the results in all cases are very similar, and basically the differ-
ence between them is just the mean and standard deviation of the two peaks in the ability values
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histogram representing the specialists and the rest.
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